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CHAPTER VI. 



THE PRINCIPLES OF A PHILOSOPHICAL LAN- 

 GUAGE FURTHER CONSIDERED. 



I. WE have, thus far, considered only one of the 

 requisites of a language adapted for the investigation 

 of truth ; that its terms shall each of them convey a 

 determinate and unmistakeable meaning. There are, 

 however, as we have already remarked, other requi- 

 sites ; some of them important only in the second 

 degree, but one which is fundamental, and barely 

 yields in point of importance, if it yields at all, to the 

 quality which we have already discussed at so much 

 length. That the language may be fitted for its pur- 

 poses, not only should every word perfectly express its 

 meaning, but there should be no important meaning 

 without its word. Whatever we have occasion to 

 think of often, and for scientific purposes, ought to 

 have a name appropriated to it. 



This requisite of philosophical language may be 

 considered under three different heads ; that number of 

 separate conditions being involved in it. 



2, First ; there ought to be all such names, as 

 are needful for making such a record of individual 

 observations that the words of the record shall exactly 

 show what fact it is which has been observed. In 

 other words, there must be an accurate Descriptive 

 Terminology. 



The only things which we can observe directly 

 being our own sensations, or other feelings, a com- 

 plete descriptive language would be one in which 



