TERMINOLOGY AND NOMENCLATURE. 291 



other general name: we may, in reforming its conno- 

 tation, leave its denotation untouched; and it is gene- 

 rally desirable to do so. The connotation, however, 

 is not the less for this the real meaning, for we at 

 once apply the name wherever the characters set down 

 in the definition are found; and that which exclu- 

 sively guides us in applying the term, must constitute 

 its signification If we find, contrary to bur previous 

 belief, that the characters are not peculiar to one 

 species, we cease to use the term coextensively with 

 the characters ; but then it is because the other portion 

 of the connotation fails ; the condition that the class 

 must be a Kind. The connotation, therefore, is still 

 the meaning; the set of descriptive characters is a 

 true definition : and the meaning is unfolded, not 

 indeed (as in other cases) by the definition alone, but 

 by the definition and the form of the word taken 

 together. 



6. We have now analyzed what is implied in the 

 two principal requisites of a philosophical language ; 

 first, precision or definiteness, and secondly, com- 

 pleteness. Any further remarks on the mode of con- 

 structing a nomenclature must be deferred until we 

 treat of Classification ; the mode of naming the Kinds 

 of things being necessarily subordinate to the mode of 

 arranging those Kinds into larger classes. With re- 

 spect to the minor requisites of Terminology, some of 

 them are well stated and copiously illustrated in the 

 "Aphorisms on the Language of Science," included 

 in Mr. WheweH's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. 

 These, as being of secondary importance in the peculiar 

 point of view of Logic, we shall leave the reader to 

 seek in Mr. Whewell's pages, and shall confine our 

 own observations to one more quality, which, next to 



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