338 FALLACIES. 



fortified on the intellectual side, that they could not 

 blind themselves to the light of truth, however really 

 desirous of doing so ; they could not, with all the 

 inclination in the world, pass off upon themselves bad 

 arguments for good ones. If the sophistry of the in- 

 tellect could be rendered impossible, that of the feel- 

 ings, having no instrument to work with, would be 

 powerless. A comprehensive classification of all those 

 things which, not being evidence, are liable to appear 

 such to the understanding, will, therefore, include all 

 errors of judgment arising from moral causes, to the 

 exclusion only of errors of practice committed against 

 better knowledge. 



To examine, then, the various kinds of apparent 

 evidence which are not evidence at all, and of appa- 

 rently conclusive evidence which do not really amount 

 to conclusiveness, is the object of that part of our 

 inquiry into which we are about to enter. 



The subject is not beyond the compass of classifi- 

 cation and comprehensive survey. The things, in- 

 deed, which are not evidence of any given conclusion, 

 are manifestly endless, and this negative property, 

 having no dependence upon any positive ones, cannot 

 be made the groundwork of a real classification. But 

 the things which, not being evidence, are susceptible 

 of being mistaken for it, are capable of a classification 

 having reference to the positive property which they 

 possess, of appearing to be evidence. We may 

 arrange them, at our choice, on either of two principles ; 

 according to the cause which makes them appear evi- 

 dence, not being so ; or according to the particular 

 kind of evidence which they simulate. The Classifi- 

 cation of Fallacies which will be attempted in the 

 ensuing chapter, is founded upon these considerations 

 jointly. 



