340 FALLACIES. 



even by the wildest aberration, be supposed to prove 

 another fact, must stand in some special position with 

 regard to it ; and if we could ascertain and define that 

 special position, we should perceive the origin of the 

 error. 



We cannot regard one fact as evidentiary of ano- 

 ther unless we believe that the two are always, or in 

 the majority of cases, conjoined. If we believe A to 

 be evidentiary of B, if when we see A we are inclined 

 to infer B from it, the reason is because we believe 

 that wherever A is, B also either always or for the 

 most part exists, either as an antecedent,, a conse- 

 quent, or a concomitant. If when we see A we are 

 inclined not to expect B, if we believe A to be evi- 

 dentiary of the absence of B, it is because we believe 

 that where A is, B either is never, or at least seldom, 

 found. Erroneous conclusions, in short, no less than 

 correct conclusions, have an invariable relation to a 

 general formula, either expressed or tacitly implied. 

 When we infer some fact from some other fact which 

 does not really prove it, we either have admitted, or 

 if we maintained consistency, ought to admit, some 

 groundless general proposition respecting the conjunc- 

 tion of the two phenomena. 



For every property, therefore, in facts, or in our 

 mode of considering facts, which leads us to believe 

 that they are habitually conjoined when they are not, 

 or that they are not when in reality they are, there is 

 a corresponding kind of Fallacy ; and an enumeration 

 of Fallacies would consist in a specification of those 

 properties in facts, and those peculiarities in our mode 

 of considering them, which give rise to this erroneous 

 opinion, 



2. To begin, then; the supposed connexion, or 



