CLASSIFICATION OF FALLACIES. 341 



repugnance, between the two facts, may either be a 

 conclusion from evidence (that is, from some other 

 proposition or propositions) or may be admitted with- 

 out any such ground ; admitted, as the phrase is, on 

 its own evidence ; embraced as self-evident, as an 

 axiomatic truth. This gives rise to the first great dis- 

 tinction, that between Fallacies of Inference, and Fal- 

 lacies of Simple Inspection. In the latter division 

 must be included not only all cases in which a propo- 

 sition is believed and held for true, literally without 

 any extrinsic evidence, either of specific experience or 

 general reasoning; but those more frequent cases in 

 which simple inspection creates a presumption in 

 favour of a proposition; not sufficient for belief, but 

 sufficient to cause the strict principles of a regular 

 induction to be dispensed with, and creating a predis- 

 position to believe it on evidence which would be seen 

 to be insufficient if no such presumption existed. 

 This class, comprehending the whole of what may 

 be termed Natural Prejudices, and which I shall call 

 indiscriminately Fallacies of Simple Inspection or Fal- 

 lacies a priori, shall be placed at the head of our list. 

 Fallacies of Inference, or erroneous conclusions 

 from supposed evidence,, must be subdivided according 

 to the nature of the apparent evidence from which 

 the conclusions are drawn ; or (what is the same 

 thing,) according to the particular kind of sound 

 argument which the fallacy in question simulates. 

 But there is a distinction to be first drawn, which does 

 not answer to any of the divisions of sound argu- 

 ments, but arises out of the nature of bad ones. We 

 may know exactly what our evidence is, and yet 

 draw a false conclusion from it ; we may conceive pre- 

 cisely what our premisses are, what alleged matters of 

 fact, or general principles, are the foundation of our 



