344 FALLACIES. 



ceed on false premisses, and those of which the pre- 

 misses, though true, do not support the conclusion. 

 But of these species, the first must necessarily fall 

 within some one of the heads already enumerated. 

 For the error must be either in those premisses which 

 are general propositions, or in those which assert indi- 

 vidual facts. In the former case it is an Inductive 

 Fallacy, of one or the other class; in the latter it is 

 a Fallacy of Observation: unless, in either case, the 

 erroneous premiss has been assumed on simple inspec- 

 tion, in which case the fallacy is a priori. Or, finally, 

 the premisses, of whichever kind they are, may never 

 have been conceived in so distinct a manner as to 

 produce any clear consciousness by what means they 

 were arrived at; as in the case of what is called 

 reasoning in a circle: and then the fallacy is of 

 Confusion. 



There remains, therefore, as the only class of 

 fallacies having properly their seat in deduction, those 

 in which the premisses of the ratiocination do not 

 bear out its conclusion ; the various cases, in short, of 

 vicious argumentation, provided against by the rules 

 of the syllogism. We shall call these, Fallacies of 

 Ratiocination. 



We have thus five distinguishable classes of fallacy, 

 which may be expressed in the following synoptic 

 table: 



of Simple Inspection . 1. Fallacies a priori. 



( Inductive ( 3> Fallacies of Observation, 

 /from evidence I Fallacies l 

 1 distinctly J I* Fallacies of Generalization. 



Fallacies 



of Inference 



conceived J Deductive \ 



[ Fallacies J 4< Fallacies of Ratiocination. 

 I from evidence i 



I indistinctly I - - - - 5. Fallacies of Confusion. 

 * conceived 



3. We must not, however, expect to find that 

 men's actual errors always, or even commonly, fall so 



