346 FALLACIES. 



usually suppressed, it frequently happens in the case 

 of a fallacy, that the hearers are left to the alternative 

 of supplying either a premiss which is not true, or else, 

 one which does not prove the conclusion: e.g., if a 

 man expatiates on the distress of the country, and 

 thence argues that the government is tyrannical, we 

 must suppose him to assume either that ' every dis- 

 tressed country is under a tyranny,' which is a mani- 

 fest falsehood, or, merely that ' every country under a 

 tyranny is distressed/ which, however true, proves 

 nothing, the middle term being undistributed." The 

 former would be ranked, in our distribution, among 

 fallacies of generalization, the latter among those of 

 ratiocination. " Which are we to suppose the speaker 

 meant us to understand ? Surely" (if he understood 

 himself) " just whichever each of his hearers might 

 happen to prefer: some might assent to the false pre- 

 miss; others allow the unsound syllogism." 



Almost all fallacies, therefore, might in strictness 

 be brought under our fifth class, Fallacies of Confu- 

 sion. A fallacy can seldom be absolutely referred to 

 any of the other classes ; we can only say, that if all 

 the links were filled up which should be capable of 

 being supplied in a valid argument, it would either 

 stand thus (forming a fallacy of one class), or thus (a 

 fallacy of another) ; or at furthest we may say, that 

 the conclusion is most likely to have originated in a 

 fallacy of such and such a class. Thus in Archbishop 

 Whately's illustration, the error committed may be 

 traced with most probability to a fallacy of generali- 

 zation; that of mistaking an uncertain mark, or piece 

 of evidence, for a certain one; concluding from an 

 effect to some one of its possible causes, when there 

 are others which would have been equally capable of 

 producing it. 



