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CHAPTER III. 



FALLACIES OF SIMPLE INSPECTION; OR 

 A PRIORI FALLACIES. 



1. THE tribe of errors of which we are to treat 

 in the first instance, are those in which no actual 

 inference takes place at all; the proposition (it cannot 

 in such cases be called a conclusion) being embraced, 

 not as proved, but as requiring no proof; as a self- 

 evident truth; or else as having such intrinsic veri- 

 similitude, that external evidence not in itself 

 amounting to proof, is sufficient in aid of the ante- 

 cedent presumption. 



An attempt to treat this subject comprehensively 

 would be a transgression of the bounds prescribed to 

 this work, since it would necessitate the inquiry 

 which, more than any other, is the grand question of 

 transcendental metaphysics, viz., What are the pro- 

 positions which may reasonably be received without 

 proof? That there must be some such propositions 

 all are agreed, since there cannot be an infinite series 

 of proof, a chain suspended from nothing. But to 

 determine what these propositions are, is the opus 

 magnum of the higher mental philosophy. Two prin- 

 cipal divisions of opinion on the subject have divided 

 the schools of philosophy from its first dawn. The 

 one recognises no ultimate premisses but the facts of 

 our subjective consciousness; our sensations, emo- 

 tions, intellectual states of mind, and volitions. These, 

 and whatever by the strict rules of Induction can be 

 derived from these, it is possible, according to this 

 theory, for us to know; of all else we must remain 



