FALLACIES OF SIMPLE INSPECTION. 361 



of the common mode of thinking on this subject, 

 declaring that the unimaginable, indeed, may possibly 

 be true, but that the inconceivable cannot: and he 

 would probably have said that the three supposed 

 impossibilities last spoken of are not cases of mere 

 unimaginableness, but of actual inconceivableness ; 

 while the action of the sun upon the earth without an 

 intervening medium, was merely unimaginable. I am 

 not aware that Coleridge has anywhere attempted to 

 define the distinction between the two; and I am 

 persuaded that, if he had, it would have broken down 

 under him . But if by unimaginableness he meant, as 

 seems likely, mere inability on our part to represent 

 the phenomenon, like a picture of something visible, 

 to the internal eye, antipodes were not unimagi- 

 nable. They were capable of being imaged; capable 

 even of being drawn, or modelled in plaster. They 

 were, however, inconceivable: the imagination could 

 paint, but the intellect could not recognise them as a 

 believable thing. Things may be inconceivable, then, 

 without being incredible: and Coleridge's distinction, 

 whether it have any foundation or not, will in no way 

 help the maxim out. 



No philosopher has more directly identified him- 

 self with the fallacy now under consideration, or has 

 embodied it in more distinct terms, than Leibnitz. In 

 his view, unless a thing was not merely conceivable, 

 but even explainable, it could not exist in nature. 

 All natural phenomena, according to him, must be 

 susceptible of being accounted for a priori. The only 

 facts of which no explanation could be given but the 

 will of God, were miracles properly so called. " Je 

 reconnais," says he*, " qu'il n'est pas permis de nier 



* Nouveaux Fssais sur I'Entendement Humain Avant-propos. 

 (GGuvres, Paris ed. 1842, vol. i., p. 19.) 



