370 FALLACIES. 



tion of this mode of speculation. The usual point 

 from which he starts in his inquiries is, that we say 

 thus or thus in common language. Thus, when he 

 has to discuss the question whether there be, in any 

 part of the universe, a void, or space in which there 

 is nothing, he inquires first in how many senses we 

 say that one thing is in another. He enumerates 

 many of these ; we say the part is in the whole, as the 

 finger is in the hand ; again we say, the species is in 

 the genus, as man is included in animal ; again, the 

 government of Greece is in the king ; and various 

 other senses are described and exemplified, but of all 

 these the most proper is when we say a thing is in a 

 vessel, and generally in place. He next examines 

 what place is, and comes to this conclusion, that ' if 

 about a body there be another body including it, it is 

 in place, and if not, not.' A body moves when it 

 changes its place ; but he adds, that if water be in a 

 vessel,, the vessel being at rest, the parts of the water 

 may still move, for they are included by each other ; 

 so that while the whole does not change its place, the 

 parts may change their place in a circular order. 

 Proceeding then to the question of a void, he as usual 

 examines the different senses in which the term is 

 used, and adopts, as the most proper, place without 

 matter; with no useful result." 



"Again, in a question concerning mechanical 

 action, he says, 'When a man moves a stone by 

 pushing it with a stick, we say both that the man 

 moves the stone, and that the stick moves the stone, 

 but the latter more properly.* 



" Again, we find the Greek philosophers applying 

 themselves to extract their dogmas from the most 

 general and abstract notions which they could detect; 

 for example, from the conception of the Universe as 



