

FALLACIES OF GENERALIZATION. 419 



assuming one class of influencing circumstances to 

 be the paramount rulers of phenomena which depend 

 in an equal or greater degree upon many others. But 

 on these considerations it is the less necessary that 

 we should now dwell, as they will occupy our attention 

 very largely in the concluding Book. 



6. The last of the modes of erroneous genera- 

 lization to which I shall advert, is that to which we 

 may give the name of False Analogies. This Fallacy 

 stands distinguished from those already treated of by 

 the peculiarity, that it does not even simulate a com- 

 plete and conclusive induction, but consists in the 

 misapplication of an argument which is at besi only 

 admissible as an inconclusive presumption, where real 

 proof is unattainable. 



An argument from analogy, is an inference that 

 what is true in a certain case is true in a case known 

 to be somewhat similar, but not known to be exactly 

 parallel, that is, to be similar in all the material cir- 

 cumstances. An object has the property B: another 

 object is not known to have that property, but resem- 

 bles the first in a property A, not known to be 

 connected with B; and the conclusion to which the 

 analogy points, is that this object has the property B 

 also. As, for example, that the planets are inhabited 

 because the earth is. The planets resemble the earth 

 in describing elliptical orbits round the sun, in being 

 attracted by it and by one another, in being spherical, 

 revolving upon their axes, &c., but it is not known 

 that any of these properties, or all of them together, 

 are the conditions upon which the possession of inha- 

 bitants is dependent, or are even marks of those con- 

 ditions. Nevertheless, so long as we do not know 



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