FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 449 



Archbishop Whately in the Appendix to his Logic : 

 "Same (as well as One, Identical, and other words 

 derived from them,) is used frequently in a sense very 

 different from its primary one, as applicable to a single 

 object ; being employed to denote great similarity. 

 When several objects are undistinguishably alike, one 

 single description will apply equally to any of them ; 

 and thence they are said to be all of one and the same 

 nature, appearance, &c. As, e. g., when we say, 

 1 this house is built of the same stone with such 

 another/ we only mean that the stones are undis- 

 tinguishable in their qualities ; not that the one build- 

 ing was pulled down, and the other constructed with 

 the materials. Whereas sameness, in the primary 

 sense, does not even necessarily imply similarity ; for 

 if we say of any man that he is greatly altered since 

 such a time, we understand, and indeed imply by the 

 very expression, that he is one person, though different 

 in several qualities. It is worth observing also, that 

 Same, in the secondary sense, admits, according to 

 popular usage, of degrees: we speak of two things 

 being nearly the same, but not entirely : personal 

 identity does not admit of degrees. Nothing, per- 

 haps, has contributed more to the error of Realism 

 than inattention to this ambiguity. When several 

 persons are said to have one and the same opinion, 

 thought, or idea, men, overlooking the true, simple 

 statement of the case, which is, that they are all think- 

 ing alike, look for something more abstruse and mysti- 

 cal, and imagine there must be some One Thing, in the 

 primary sense, though not an individual, which is pre- 

 sent at once in the mind of each of these persons ; and 

 thence readily sprung Plato's theory of Ideas, each of 

 which was, according to him, one real, eternal object, 



VOL. II. 2 Ci 



