450 FALLACIES. 



existing entire and complete in each of the individual 

 objects that are known by one name." 



It is, indeed, not a matter of inference but of 

 authentic history, that Plato's doctrine of Ideas, and 

 the Aristotelian doctrine (essentially the same as the 

 Platonic) of substantial forms and second substances, 

 grew up in the precise way here pointed out ; from 

 the. supposed necessity of finding, in things which were 

 said to have the same nature, or the same qualities, 

 something which was the same in the very sense in 

 whiclr a man is the same as himself. All the idle 

 speculations respecting TO ov, TO ev, TO O/AO/OV, and 

 similar abstractions, so common in the ancient and 

 in some modern schools of philosophy, sprung from 

 the same source. The Aristotelian logicians had, 

 however, seen one case of the ambiguity, and provided 

 against it with their peculiar felicity in the invention 

 of technical language, when they distinguished things 

 which differed both specie and numero from those 

 which differed numero tantum, that is, which were 

 exactly alike (in some particular respect at least) but 

 were distinct individuals. An extension of this dis- 

 tinction to the two meanings of the word Same, 

 namely, things which are the same specie tantum, and 

 a thing which is the same numero as well as specie, 

 would have prevented the confusion which has been a 

 source of so much darkness and such an abundance 

 of positive error in the higher philosophy. 



One of the most singular examples of the lengths 

 to which a philosopher of eminence may be led away 

 by an ambiguity of language, is afforded by this very 

 case. I refer to the famous argument by which 

 Bishop Berkeley flattered himself that he had for ever 

 put an end to " scepticism, atheism, and irreligion." 



