480 LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



trine, as sometimes held, is open to these imputations; 

 for the misapprehension in which I shall be able to 

 show that they originate, unfortunately is not con- 

 fined to the opponents of the doctrine, but partici- 

 pated in by many, perhaps we might say by most, 

 of its supporters. 



2. Correctly conceived, the doctrine called Phi- 

 losophical Necessity is simply this: that, given the 

 motives which are present to an individual's mind, 

 and given likewise the character and disposition of 

 the individual, the manner in which he will act may 

 be unerringly inferred: that if we knew the person 

 thoroughly, and knew all the inducements which are 

 acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct with 

 as much certainty as we can predict any physical 

 event. This proposition I take to be a mere inter- 

 pretation of universal experience, a statement in words 

 of what every one is internally convinced of. No one 

 who believed that he knew thoroughly the circum- 

 stances of any case, and the characters of the different 

 persons concerned, would hesitate to foretell how all 

 of them would actTJ Whatever degree of doubt he 

 may in fact feel, arises from the uncertainty whether 

 he really knows the circumstances, or the character of 

 some one or other of the persons, with the degree of 

 accuracy required; but by no means from thinking 

 that if he did know these things, there could be any 

 uncertainty what the conduct would be. Nor does 

 this full assurance conflict in the smallest degree with 

 what is called our feeling of freedom. We do not 

 feel ourselves the less free, because those to whom we 

 are intimately known are well assured how we shall 

 will to act in a particular case. We often, on the 

 contrary, regard the doubt what our conduct will be, 



