LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. 485 



acting in a particular way, or at least that no effort of 

 his own can hinder it. In the words of the sect which 

 in our own day has so perseveringly inculcated and so 

 perversely misunderstood this great doctrine, his cha- 

 racter is formed for him, and not by him; therefore 

 his wishing that it had been formed differently is of no 

 use; he has no power to alter it. But this is a grand 

 error. He has, to a certain extent, a power to alter 

 his character. Its being, in the ultimate resort, formed 

 for him, is not inconsistent with its being, in part, 

 formed by him as one of the intermediate agents. His 

 character is formed by his circumstances (including 

 among these his particular organization); but his own 

 desire to mould it in a particular way, is one of those 

 circumstances, and by no means one of the least 

 influential. We cannot, indeed, directly will to be 

 different from what we are. But neither did those 

 who are supposed to have formed our characters, 

 directly will that we should be what we are. Their 

 will had no direct power except over their own actions. 

 They made us what they did make us, by willing, not 

 the end, but the requisite means : and we, when our 

 habits are not too inveterate, can, by similarly willing 

 the requisite means, make ourselves different. If they 

 could place us under the influence of certain circum- 

 stances, we, in like manner, can place ourselves under 

 the influence of other circumstances. We are exactly 

 as capable of making our own character, if we will, as 

 others are of making it for us. 



Yes (answers the Owenite), but these words, "if 

 we will," surrender the whole point : since the will to 

 alter our own character is given us, not by any efforts 

 of ours, but by circumstances which we cannot help ; 

 it comes to us either from external causes, or not at 

 all. Most true : if the Owenite stops here, he is in a 



