488 LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



motive does not mean always, or solely, the antici- 

 pation of a pleasure or of a pain. I shall not here 

 inquire whether it be true that, in the commencement, 

 all our voluntary actions are mere means consciously 

 employed to obtain some pleasure, or avoid some 

 pain. It is at least certain that we gradually, through 

 the influence of association, come to desire the means 

 without thinking of the end: the action itself becomes 

 an object of desire, and is performed without refer- 

 ence to any motive beyond itself. Thus far, it may 

 still be objected, that, the action having through asso- 

 ciation become pleasurable, we are, as much as 

 before, moved to act by the anticipation of a pleasure, 

 namely the pleasure of the action itself. But grant- 

 ing this, the matter does not end here. As we pro- 

 ceed in the formation of habits, and become accus- 

 tomed to will a particular act or a particular course 

 of conduct because it is pleasurable, we at last con- 

 tinue to will it whether it is pleasurable or not. 

 Although, from some change in us or in our circum- 

 stances, we have ceased to find any pleasure in the 

 action, or to anticipate any pleasure as the conse- 

 quence of it, we still continue to desire the action, 

 and consequently to do it. In this manner it is that 

 habits of hurtful indulgence continue to be practised 

 although they have ceased to be pleasurable ; and in 

 this manner also it is that the habit of willing to per- 

 severe in a prescribed course does not desert the 

 moral hero, even when the reward, however real, 

 which he doubtless receives from the consciousness of 

 well-doing, is anything but an equivalent for the 

 sufferings he undergoes, or the wishes which he may 

 have to renounce. 



A habit of willing is commonly called a purpose; 

 and among the causes of our volitions, and of the 



