504 LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



or may Lave been, present, and why therefore, they 

 say, should not A have been generated from B and C? 

 But even if this evidence were carried to the highest 

 degree of completeness which it admits of; if it were 

 shown that certain groups of associated ideas not only 

 might have been, but actually were, present whenever 

 the more recondite mental feeling was experienced; 

 this would amount only to the Method of Agreement, 

 and could not prove causation until confirmed by the 

 more conclusive evidence of the Method of Difference. 

 If the question be whether Belief is a mere case of 

 close association of ideas, it would be necessary to 

 examine experimentally if it be true that any ideas 

 whatever, provided they are associated together with 

 the required degree of closeness, are sufficient to give 

 rise to belief. If the inquiry be into the origin of 

 moral feelings," the feelings for example of moral 

 reprobation, the first step must be to compare all the 

 varieties of actions or states of mind which are ever 

 morally disapproved, and see whether in all these 

 cases it can be shown that the action or state of mind 

 had become connected by association, in the disap- 

 proving mind, with some particular class of hateful or 

 disgusting ideas; and the method employed is, thus 

 far, that of Agreement. But this is not enough. 

 Supposing this proved,, we must try further by the 

 Method of Difference, whether this particular kind 

 of hateful or disgusting ideas, when it becomes asso- 

 ciated with an action previously indifferent, will render 

 that action a subject of moral disapproval. If this 

 question can be answered in the affirmative, it is 

 shown to be a law of the human mind, that an associa- 

 tion of that particular description is the generating 

 cause of moral reprobation. But these experiments 

 have either never been tried, or never with the 



