552 LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



unbending practical maxims. Such, for example, are all 

 who found their theories of politics upon what is called 

 abstract right, that is to say, upon universal precepts ; 

 a pretension of which we have already noticed the 

 chimerical nature. Such, in like manner, are those 

 who make the assumption of a social contract, or any 

 other kind of original obligation, and apply it to 

 particular cases by mere interpretation. But in this 

 the fundamental error is the attempt to treat an art 

 like a science, and to have a deductive art ;( the irra- 

 tionality of which will be shown in a futufe chapter. 

 It will be proper to take our exemplification of the 

 geometrical theory from those thinkers who have 

 avoided this additional error, and, who entertain, so 

 far, a juster idea of the nature of political inquiry. 



We may cite, in the first instance, those who 

 assume as the principle of their political philosophy 

 that government is founded on fear; that the dread 

 of each other is the one motive by which human 

 beings were originally brought into a state of society, 

 and are still held in it. Some of the earlier scientific 

 inquirers into politics, in particular Hobbes, assumed 

 this proposition, not by implication, but avowedly, as 

 the foundation of their doctrine, and attempted to 

 build a complete philosophy of politics thereupon. It 

 is true that Hobbes (who is so much the most con- 

 siderable of these,, that we need not particularly advert 

 to any of the rest) did not find this one maxim suffi- 

 cient to carry him through the whole of his subject, 

 but was obliged to eke it out by the double sophism 

 of an original contract. I call this a double sophism; 

 first, as passing off a fiction for a fact, and secondly, 

 as assuming a practical principle, or precept, as the 

 basis of a theory; which is a petitio principii, since (as 

 we noticed in treating of that Fallacy) every rule of 



