554 LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



far from being universally true. Men are not governed 

 in all their actions by their worldly interests. This, 

 however, is by no means so conclusive an objection as 

 it at first appears ; because in politics we are for the 

 most part concerned with the conduct not of indi- 

 vidual men, but either of a series of men (as a suc- 

 cession of kings,) or a body or mass of men, as a 

 nation, an aristocracy, or a representative assembly. 

 And whatever is true of a large majority of mankind, 

 may without much error be taken for true of any suc- 

 cession of persons, considered as a whole, or of any 

 collection of persons in which the act of the majority 

 becomes the act of the whole body. Although, there- 

 fore, the maxim is sometimes expressed in a manner 

 unnecessarily paradoxical, the consequences drawn 

 from it will hold equally good if the assertion be 

 limited as follows Any succession of men, or the 

 majority of any body of men, will be governed in the 

 bulk of their conduct by their personal interests. We 

 are bound to allow to this school of philosophers the 

 benefit of this more rational statement of their funda- 

 mental maxim, which moreover is in strict conformity 

 to the explanations which, when considered to be 

 called for, have been given by themselves. 



The theory goes on to infer, correctly enough, that 

 if the actions of mankind are determined in the main 

 by their selfish interests,, the only rulers who will 

 govern according to the interest of the governed, are 

 those whose selfish interests are in accordance with 

 it. And to this is added a third proposition, namely, 

 that no rulers have their selfish interest identical with 

 that of the governed, unless it be rendered so by 

 accountability, that is, by dependence upon the will of 

 the governed. In other words (and as the result of 

 the whole), that the desire of retaining or the fear of 



