HISTORICAL METHOD. 591 



most, strictly adjacent cases. Now,, M. Comte alone 

 has seen the necessity of thus connecting all our 

 generalizations from history with the laws of human 

 nature ; and he alone, therefore, has arrived at any 

 results truly scientific ; though in the speculations of 

 others there will be found many happy apercus, and 

 valuable hints for future philosophers. 



4. But, while it is an imperative rule never 

 to introduce any generalization from history into 

 the social science unless sufficient grounds can be 

 pointed out for it in human nature, I do not think any 

 one will contend that it would have been possible, 

 setting out from the principles of human nature 

 and from the general circumstances of man's position 

 in the universe, to determine a priori the order in 

 which human development must take place, and to 

 predict, consequently, the general facts of history up 

 to the present time. The initial stages of human pro- 

 gress, when man, as yet unmodified by society, and 

 characterized only by the instincts resulting directly 

 from his organization, was acted upon by outward 

 objects of a comparatively simple and universal 

 character, might indeed, as M. Comte remarks, be 

 deduced from the laws of human nature; which 

 moreover is the only possible mode of ascertaining 

 them, since of that form of human existence no direct 

 memorials are preserved. But (as he justly observes) 

 after the first few terms of the series, the influence 

 exercised over each generation by the generations 

 which preceded it, becomes more and more pre- 

 ponderant over all other influences ; until at length 

 what we now are and do, is in a very small degree 

 the result of the universal circumstances of the human 

 race, or even of our own circumstances acting through 



