618 LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



m,axims ; overlooking the necessity of constantly refer- 

 ring back to the principles of the speculative science, 

 in order to be sure of attaining even the specific end 

 which the rules have in view. How much greater 

 still, then, must the error be, of setting up such un- 

 bending principles, not merely as universal rules for 

 attaining a given end, but as rules of conduct gene- 

 rally ; without regard to the possibility, not only that 

 some modifying cause may prevent the attainment of 

 the given end by the means which the rule prescribes, 

 but that success itself may conflict with some other 

 end, which may possibly chance to be more desirable. 

 This is the habitual error of many of the political 

 speculators whom I have characterized as the geome- 

 trical school ; especially in France, where ratiocination 

 from rules of practice forms the staple commodity of 

 journalism and political oratory ; a misapprehension of 

 the functions of Deduction which has brought much 

 discredit, in the estimation of foreigners, upon the spirit 

 of generalization so honourably characteristic of the 

 French mind . The common-places of politics, in France , 

 are large and sweeping practical maxims, from which 

 as ultimate premisses men reason downwards to parti- 

 cular applications, and this they call being logical and 

 consistent. For instance, they are perpetually argu- 

 ing that such and such a measure ought to be adopted, 

 because it is a consequence of the principle on which 

 the form of government is founded; of the principle 

 of legitimacy, or the principle of the sovereignty of 

 the people. To which it may be answered, that if 

 these be really practical principles, they must rest 

 upon speculative grounds; the sovereignty of the 

 people (for example) must be a right foundation for 

 government, because a government thus constituted 

 tends to produce certain beneficial effects. Inasmuch, 



