620 LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



groups and arranges its truths so as to enable us to 

 take in at one view as much as possible of the general 

 order of the universe. Art, though it must assume 

 the same general laws, follows them only into such 

 of their detailed consequences as have led to the for- 

 mation of rules of conduct; and brings together from 

 parts of the field of science most remote from one 

 another, the truths relating to the production of the 

 different and heterogeneous conditions necessary to 

 each effect which the exigencies of practical life 

 require to be produced. 



On this natural difference between the order of the 

 propositions of Science and those of Art (science 

 following one cause to its various effects, while art 

 traces one effect to its multiplied and diversified 

 causes and conditions), a principle may be grounded, 

 which has been suggested with his usual sagacity, but 

 not dwelt upon or accompanied with the necessary 

 explanations,, by M. Comte. It is, that there ought 

 to be a set of intermediate scientific truths, derived 

 from the higher generalities of science, and destined 

 to serve as the generalia or first principles of the 

 various arts. The scientific operation of framing 

 these intermediate principles, M. Comte considers as 

 one of those results of philosophy which are reserved 

 for futurity. The only complete example which he 

 can point out as actually realized, and which can be 

 held up as a type to be imitated in more important 

 matters, is the general theory of the art of Descriptive 

 Geometry, as conceived by M. Monge. It is not, 

 however, difficult to understand what the nature of 

 these intermediate general principles must be. After 

 framing the most comprehensive possible conception 

 of the end to be aimed at, that is, of the effect to be 

 produced, and determining in the same comprehensive 



