622 LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES. 



Without entering into the disputed questions 

 respecting the foundation of morality, we may consider 

 as a conclusion following alike from all systems of 

 ethics, that, in a certain description of cases at least, 

 morality consists in the simple observance of a rule. 

 The cases in question are those in which, although any 

 rule which can he formed is probably (as we remarked 

 on maxims of policy) more or less imperfectly adapted 

 to a portion of the cases which it comprises, there is 

 still a necessity that some rule, of a nature simple 

 enough to be easily understood and remembered, 

 should not only be laid down for guidance, but uni- 

 versally observed, in order that the various persons 

 concerned may know what they have to expect: the 

 inconvenience of uncertainty on their part being a 

 greater evil than that which may possibly arise, in a 

 minority of cases, from the imperfect adaptation of 

 the rule to those cases. 



Such, for example, is the rule of veracity; that of 

 not infringing the legal rights of others; and so forth: 

 concerning which it is obvious that although many 

 cases exist in which a deviation from the rule would 

 in the particular case produce more good than evil, it 

 is necessary for general security, either that the rules 

 should be inflexibly observed, or that the license of 

 deviating from them, if such be ever permitted, should 

 be confined to definite classes of cases, and of a very 

 peculiar and extreme nature. 



With respect, therefore, to these cases, practical 

 ethics must, like the administration of positive law, 

 follow a method strictly and directly ratiocinative : 

 whether the rules themselves are obtained, like those 

 of other arts, from a scientific consideration of ten- 

 dencies, or are referred to the authority of intuitive 

 consciousness or express revelation. 



