LOGIC OF PRACTICE OR ART. 623 



In cases, however, in which there does not 

 exist a necessity for a common rule, to be acknow- 

 ledged and relied upon as the basis of social life; 

 where we are at liberty to inquire what is the 

 most moral course under the particular circumstances 

 of the case, without reference to the authorised expec- 

 tations of other people; there the Method of Ethics 

 cannot differ materially from the method of every 

 other department of practice. Like other arts, it 

 sets out from a general principle, or original major 

 premiss, enunciative of its particular end.: whether 

 that end be the greatest possible happiness, as is con- 

 tended by some, or the conformity of our character 

 to ideal perfection according to some particular 

 standard, as others hold. But on this as on other 

 subjects, when the end has been laid down, it belongs 

 to Science to inquire what are the kinds of actions by 

 which this end, this happiness or this perfection of 

 character, is capable of being realised. When Science 

 has framed propositions, which are the completed 

 expression of the whole of the conditions necessary to 

 the desired end, these are handed over to Art, which 

 has nothing further to do but to transform them into 

 corresponding rules of conduct. 



7. With these remarks we must close this sum- 

 mary view of the application of the general logic of 

 scientific inquiry to the moral and social departments 

 of science. Notwithstanding the extreme generality 

 of the principles of method which I have laid down (a 

 generality which I trust is not, in this instance, syno- 

 nymous with vagueness), I have indulged the hope 

 that to some of those on whom the task will devolve 

 of bringing those most important of all sciences into a 

 more satisfactory state, these observations may be 



