Evolution of Mind. 255 



occur resulting in the transmission of an impulse, say, 

 to the hand. As the receiver of one sensation and 

 the transmitter of another is the brain, the centre of 

 the state of consciousness is either the molecular 

 changes in the brain cells, or it is something bridging 

 the receptive and transmissive brain cells. 



But as physiologists cannot detect a condition in 

 the physical chain of motion, or brain-bridge of cells, 

 which in their opinion would represent consciousness, 

 they postulate consciousness to be an " immaterial 

 agent "* or ghost outside of the physical chain. This 

 is a lamentable break-down on the part of scientists, 

 a contemptible confession of weakness, if not incapa- 

 city, for it unscientifically shuts the door on further 

 investigation, and at the same time explains nothing. 



Captious critics also say that " a statement of all 

 the processes of consciousness even in physiological 

 terms does not explain consciousness." This, how- 

 ever, depends upon the investigator, and the kind of 

 explanation he looks for. A preliminary point would 

 be to define the kind of explanation that is required, 

 for the defect in comprehension may be more in the 

 obtuseness of the critic than in the obscurity of the 

 physiologist. To understand requires perspicacity in 

 the inquirer as well as perspicuity in the teacher. 

 We, as men, can only know that which man can know, 

 and we can only understand that which can be under- 

 stood. Hence, if we refuse to accept an explanation 



* Physiology of the Senses. Professors M'Kendrick and Snodgrass, 

 p. 297. 



