<g% ECONOMICS OF LAND TENURE IN GEORGIA [98 



have important bearings upon the question of land 

 tenure, but it is a phase of the matter not of immediate 

 interest in this connection. It is now desired to point 

 out the varying relations which landlords and tenants 

 sustain to the risks of nature under the several systems 

 of land tenure, and to determine what effect such rela- 

 tions have upon the distribution of the product. 



It is found that the share systems entail greater risks 

 upon the landlords than do the cash systems, and vice 

 versa for the tenant. According to the share plans the 

 landlord's rent depends upon the size of the crop, whereas 

 under the cash plans the landlord's contract calls for a 

 definite amount of the product or of money regardless of 

 the size of the specific crop. Under the operation of 

 such a dynamic influence as crop contingencies, it is of 

 consequence to know whether the landlord is to have a 

 percentage or an absolute amount of the yield. In the 

 absence of countervailing influences the percentage rent 

 is higher than the absolute rent, because the landlord 

 normally prefers a certainty to an uncertainty, and he 

 accepts the certainty unless an inducement is offered suffi- 

 ciently large to act as an offset to the disutility due to 

 uncertainty. Of course the same principle operates in 

 the case of the tenant. When he assumes all the risk, as 

 in cash tenancy, he must receive a return somewhat 

 larger to act as an offset to the disutility of uncertainty. 



These matters might for theoretical purposes be car- 

 ried into greater detail, but enough has been said to 

 indicate that in each of the six systems of farming a part 

 of the product may be regarded as compensation for the 

 risks due to natural crop contingencies. This part of the 

 product, therefore, tends to go sometimes to the land- 

 lord, sometimes to the tenant, and sometimes to both, 

 according to the system employed. It goes without say- 



