i63 NATURE AND MAN. 



those who blindly uphold the method of Gall, in disregard of all 

 the improvements which have taken place in our knowledge of 

 neurology since his time, and who regard the present phrenological 

 system as so perfect as to be incapable of improvement, we certainly 

 despair of making any impression. We would not be supposed to 

 assert our conviction that our own views, as now expressed, are so 

 complete as to be incapable of further improvement. Considering, 

 as we do, that the whole science of encephalic phrenology is in 

 its infancy — that a large amount of information as to the funda- 

 mental data on which it must be built up is yet wanting — that 

 the progress of comparative anatomy, of embryology, and of 

 microscopy may make many additions to our knowledge of the 

 connections of different parts of the nervous centres, which may 

 tend to modify previously received doctrines — and that, on the 

 other hand, an entirely new system of psychological observation 

 must be carried out, in order to bring psychology and physiology 

 into their proper relation ; it would be absurd in us to attempt to 

 lay down dogmatic conclusions, by which to stand or fall. We 

 would be understood as attempting nothing in this article, but to 

 test the relative validity of two rival methods of philosophizing on 

 this subject. Our conviction of the uniformity of Nature is such, 

 that we are thoroughly persuaded that there can be no real con- 

 tradiction between her various indications, when these are properly 

 brought together and compared ; and our attempt has been to 

 point out the application of the method, which has elsewhere been 

 pursued with complete success, to neurological investigation. We 

 deem it particularly incumbent upon us to point out that even if 

 our views should be proved to be erroneous as to a few minor 

 points — such, for example, as the offices of the thalami and corpora 

 striata — our main argument is not affected. The points for which 

 we contend are simply these : the independent character of the 

 sensory ganglia as the instruments of sensation and of consensual 

 actions ; the superadded character of the cerebrum, as the organ 

 by whose instrumentality ideas are formed, and reasoning processes 

 are carried on ; and the mixed character of the emotions and pro- 

 pensities, as compounded of ideas and sbnple feelings of pleasure 

 and pain. On this last point we venture to think that we have 

 made a real advance in psychology, which will prove to be im- 



