1 66 NATURE AND MAN. 



continuance. We think that no one can doubt this, who can 

 analyze his own consciousness as to those states of " reverie " in 

 which the mind is completely withdrawn from the contemplation 

 of external objects, and is concentrated, as it were, upon itself. 

 A person who is subject to such fits of "absence of mind," may 

 fall into one of them whilst walking the streets; his whole atten- 

 tion shall be absorbed in his train of thought, so that he is 

 conscious of no more interruption in its continuity than if his 

 body were perfectly at rest, and his reverie was taking place in 

 the quietude of his own study ; and yet, during the whole of 

 that time, his hmbs shall have been in motion, carrying him along 

 the accustomed path ; and his vision shall have given the direc- 

 tion to these movements which is requisite to guide him along a 

 particular line, or to move him out of it for the avoidance of 

 obstacles. In such a case it would seem as if the contact of 

 the foot with the ground, in making each step, was the stimulus 

 to the next movement ; and as if the visual organs exerted just 

 the same automatic guidance over the direction of the progres- 

 sion as they appear to do in animals which do not possess a 

 distinct organ of intelligence and will. The complete occupation 

 of the mind in other ways, as in close conversation or argument, 

 is equally favourable to this independent action of the automatic 

 apparatus in progression ; and many other cases might be cited, 

 in which an habitual train of actions, such as reading aloud, or 

 playing on a musical instrument, is not interrupted by the complete 

 withdrawal of the attention, and consequent suspension of volun- 

 tary effort. 



It would be difficult to explain such phenomena on the 

 hypothesis of the " distinct system ; " because we cannot con- 

 ceive how a set of movements originally performed by the 

 sensori- volitional or cerebral fibres can ever be transferred to 

 the excito-motor or spinal ; and every one allows that in man 

 these movements are in the first instance prompted by the will and 

 performed under the guidance of sensations. On our hypothesis, 

 on the other hand, the solution is easy and natural. Even when 

 voluntary, as they are in the first instance, these movements are 

 performed by the instrumentality of the automatic apparatus ; and 

 the influence of habit gradually links on the actions to the 



