THE DOCTRINE OF HUMAN AUTOMATISM. 283 



that the automatism of the cerebrum is itself directed and con- 

 trolled by some higher power. 



That we can form no conception of the nature of the causal 

 relation between mental and bodily phenomena, is nothing to the 

 purpose — as Professor Huxley himself distinctly admits in regard 

 to the production of sensations and other mental changes by 

 "modes of motion" of the nervous system. But if (to use his 

 own appropriate terms) neuroses can give rise to psychoses, it is 

 surely quite accordant with the great fundamental principle of 

 interaction to affirm that conversely psychoses can give rise to 

 neuroses ; just as the electricity generated in a voltaic battery by 

 chemical change, can itself produce chemical change. Professor 

 Clifford, indeed, refuses to admit a causal relation either way, 

 giving no other reason for his refusal than his inability to conceive 

 how a "motion of molecules" can be produced in any other 

 mode than by a motion of neighbouring molecules. But I am 

 yet to learn that either in this or any other case, our deductions 

 from experience are to be limited by our ability to supply their 

 rationale. 



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