THE LIMITS OF HUMAN AUTOMATISM. 309 



of duty a preponderating force in the regulation of the conduct. 

 The deliverance of the universal experience of mankind upon 

 this point, seems to me to take a rank equal to that of our 

 common-sense decision in regard to the reality of an external 

 world. And it is confirmed by the superior efficacy of our 

 appeal to the better nature of the individual we are endeavouring 

 to rescue, when this is backed by the assurance that he has the 

 power of escape from the enslavement which he feels to be 

 gradually closing in upon him, if he will but resolutely exert it. 

 We say to him : — " You can conquer, if you will. And it rests 

 " with yourself to will. You have every possible motive of the 

 " highest kind on the one side, and nothing but the attraction of 

 " a selfish indulgence on the other. Be a man, and not a beast. 

 " Exert the power which you know and feel yourself to possess ; 

 " keep your thoughts and affections steadily fixed upon the right ; 

 " avoid the first step in the downward path ; and when the 

 "moment of unexpected temptation comes, make a vigorous 

 " effort, determine to succeed, and you will come off victorious. 

 " And when you have once done so, you will feel a more assured 

 " conviction that you can do so again ; each victory will make the 

 "next easier to you; and, by steady perseverance, you will re- 

 " acquire that power of self direction which will enable you to 

 "keep straight without an effort." — I appeal to the experience of 

 such as have had to deal with these sad cases, whether this is not 

 the more effective method. 



Whatever allowances Society may be ready to make for indi- 

 vidual cases — such, for instance, as that of Hartley Coleridge, 

 who was the victim of a strong hereditary predisposition, accom- 

 panied by a constitutional weakness of will, — it recognizes as a 

 fixed conviction, and consistently acts upon that conviction, that 

 the incipient drunkard has a power over himself; that he can not 

 only abstain if he chooses, but that he ca?i choose to abstain because 

 he knows that he oir^ht to do so ; and that when, by voluntarily 

 giving way to his propensity, he brings himself into a condition 

 in which he is no more responsible for his actions than a lunatic, 

 he is not thereby exempted from the penalty that may attach to 

 them, but must be held responsible for having knowingly and 

 deliberately brought himself into the condition of irresponsibility. 



