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apostle. His object, like that of his great forerunner, is 

 the destruction of superstition; and considering that men 

 in his day trembled before every natural event as a direct 

 monition from the gods, and that everlasting torture was 

 also in prospect, the freedom aimed at by Lucretius might 

 be deemed a positive good. "This terror," he says, "and 

 darkness of mind, must be dispelled, not by the rays of 

 the sun and glittering shafts of day, but by the aspect 

 and the law of nature." He refutes the notion that any- 

 thing can come out of nothing, or that what is once be- 

 gotten can be recalled to nothing. The first beginnings, 

 the atoms, are indestructible, and into them all things can 

 be resolved at last. Bodies are partly atoms and partly 

 combinations of atoms; but the atoms nothing can quench. 

 They are strong in solid singleness, and, by their denser 

 combination, all things can be closely packed and exhibit 

 enduring strength. He denies that matter is infinitely di- 

 visible. We come at length to the atoms, without which, 

 as an imperishable substratum, all order in the generation 

 and development of things would be destroyed. 



The mechanical shock of the atoms being, in his view, 

 the all-sufficient cause of things, he combats the notion 

 that the constitution of nature has been in any way deter- 

 mined by intelligent design. The interaction of the atoms 

 throughout infinite time rendered all manner of combina- 

 tions possible. Of these, the fit ones persisted, while the 

 unfit ones disappeared. Not after sage deliberation did 

 the atoms station themselves in their right places, nor did 

 they bargain what motions they should assume. From all 

 eternity they have been driven together, and, after trying 

 motions and unions of every kind, they fell at length into 

 the arrangements out of which this system of things has 



