SCIENCE AND MAN 381 



ties, are given to us without our being consulted; and if, 

 while capable of acting within certain limits in accordance 

 with our wishes, we are not masters of the circumstances 

 in which motives and wishes originate; if, finally, our 

 motives and wishes determine our actions — in what sense 

 can these actions be said to be the result of free-will? 



Here, again, we are confronted with the question of 

 moral responsibility, which, as it has been much talked 

 of lately, it is desirable to meet. With the view of re- 

 moving the fear of our falling back into the condition of 

 "the ape and tiger," so sedulously excited by certain 

 writers, I propose to grapple with this question in its 

 rudest form, and in the most uncompromising way. "If," 

 says the robber, the ravisher, or the murderer, "I act be- 

 cause I must act, what right have you to hold me respon- 

 sible for my deeds?" The reply is, "The right of society 

 to protect itself against aggressive and injurious forces, 

 whether they be bond or free, forces of nature or forces 

 of man." "Then," retorts the criminal, "you punish me 

 for what I cannot help." "Let it be granted," says so- 

 ciety, "but had you known that the treadmill or the gal- 

 lows was certainly in store for you, you might have 

 *helped.' Let us reason the matter fully and frankly out. 

 We may entertain no malice or hatred against you; it is 

 enough that with a view to our own safety and purifica- 

 tion we are determined that you and such as you shall 

 not enjoy liberty of evil action in our midst. You, who 

 have behaved as a wild beast, we claim the right to cage 

 or kill as we should a wild beast. The public safety is a 

 matter of more importance than the very limited chance 

 of your moral renovation, while the knowledge that you 



