428 FRAGMENTS OF SCIENCE 



hold the automaton theory that states of consciousness are 

 produced by the motion of the molecules of the brain; and 

 this production of consciousness by molecular motion is 

 to me quite as unpresentable to the mental vision as the 

 production of molecular motion by consciousness. If I 

 reject one result I must reject both. /, however^ reject 

 neither^ and thus stand in the presence of two Incompre- 

 hensibles, instead of one Incomprehensible." Here I se- 

 cede from the automaton theory, though maintained by 

 friends who have all my esteem, and fall back upon the 

 avowal which occurs with such wearisome iteration 

 throughout the foregoing pages; namely, my own utter 

 incapacity to grasp the problem. 



This avowal is repeated with emphasis in the passage 

 to which Professor Virchow's translator draws attention. 

 What, I there ask, is the causal connection between the 

 objective and the subjective — between molecular motions 

 and states of consciousness? My answer is: I do not see 

 the connection, nor am I acquainted with anybody who 

 does. It is no explanation to say that the objective and 

 subjective are two sides of one and the same phenomenon. 

 Why should the phenomenon have two sides ? This is the 

 very core of the difficulty. There are plenty of molecular 

 motions which do not exhibit this two-sidedness. Does 

 water think or feel when it runs into frost-ferns upon a 

 window pane? If not, why should the molecular motion 

 of the brain be yoked to this mysterious companion — con- 

 sciousness? We can form a coherent picture of all the 

 purely physical processes — the stirring of the brain, the 

 thrilling of the nerves, the discharging of the muscles, 

 and all the subsequent motions of the organism. We are 

 here dealing with mechanical problems which are mentally 



