XXXli PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION 



fore the priority of right to it. On this account I 

 ask the attention of readers to the Appendices, 

 which serve to put my view in the clearest Hght, 

 and especially to Appendix C, in which the main 

 differences between my own theory and that of 

 the Oxford Essayists are pointed out, and the 

 objections stated to which I think the Oxford view 

 is exposed. 



Of my reviewers I have surely no complaint to 

 make but that of a pretty general failure to take in 

 the full and exact meaning of the theory I present. 

 This failure, I fear, is owing, at least in part, to the 

 dismembered form in which the view is set forth 

 — that of separate essays, occupied with topics 

 not obviously connected, and addressed to readers 

 generally cultivated rather than to philosophical 

 experts. Accordingly, in the various Appendices 

 I have aimed to correct these misapprehensions 

 and to reply to objections which, almost without 

 exception, are founded on misunderstandings. There 

 are, in particular, two lines of objection upon which 

 I feel it important to advert here in some detail. 



The first is that which comes from confounding 

 Personal with Subjective Idealism. I think I have 

 the right to say that I have taken all pains to pre- 

 vent the misapprehension upon which this confusion 

 rests ; but unfortunately to little purpooc, it would 



