xl PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION 



attention to the passage in Appendix D ^ where I 

 have dealt with it briefly in replying to one of the 

 points of my reviewer in the New York Tribune. I 

 have now also inserted in the original Preface ^ a 

 clause of preparatory reference to the subject. On 

 account of the room required, any adequate treat- 

 ment of this question must be left over to the system- 

 atic exposition of Personal Idealism which I still hope 

 to accomplish. 



The second line of objection charges me with fail- 

 ing to furnish proofs of propositions fundamental to 

 my theory. This, too, I am sure, is based on misap- 

 prehension as to what the essential proofs are, — the 

 proofs really required and actually offered. For in- 

 stance, to designate one case of several, the far from 

 hostile reviewer in the number of Nature for August 

 I, 1 90 1, makes the mistake of supposing that my 

 problem in Essay VII is the demonstration of human 

 freedom, and that the proof offered is the indispensa- 

 bleness of freedom to moral responsibility. This quite 

 misses the governing aim of that essay, which is to 

 exhibit the capabilities of Personal Idealism for solv- 

 ing, by a transcending conception, the pseudo-anti- 

 nomy set up by the monistic Absolutism of Hegel 

 and his later followers, on the one hand, and the 

 pluralistic Fortuitism of Peirce and James and most 



1 See p. 418, below. 2 ggj. p. xxiii, above. 



