xlii PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION 



sarian rationalism of Hegel's school, and of a plural- 

 ism rationally organised by the self-definition of each 

 mind in it, as transcending the irrational pluralism 

 — confessed to repose at bottom on chance and unin- 

 telligibility — which is all that is attainable on the 

 *' radical empiricism " of Professor James and his asso- 

 ciates. The freedom that consists in self -definition, 

 I next proceed to show, implies the supertemporal 

 (that is, the "eternal") coexistence of all minds, each 

 a centre of origination for the definite connexions of 

 the parts of its experience, — provided it involves 

 experience in its self-definition, as we human beings 

 do. Thus far, I am only dealing with the conception 

 of such a world of genuine free-agents, spontaneously 

 harmonised by a generic rationality, and showing 

 what it could do for the opening of the " no thorough- 

 fares " come upon in the course of our past philo- 

 sophical struggles, provided the reality of it could 

 only be made out. The graver question, whether any 

 such veritably self-defining being really exists, whether 

 there is a real world of free-agents, and whether we 

 belong in it, has not, to this point, been reached ; it 

 only comes up later in the essay, in the context of 

 defending the conception of Personal Idealism, the 

 supposed world of coeternal free-agents, against the 

 accusations of atheism and of polytheism. There, at 

 length, the bare conception of true freedom, as in- 

 volving the coeternity of all minds with each other 



