PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION xliii 



and with God, is carried over into reality by means 

 of a clarified and reformed statement of Descartes's 

 proof that any mind is necessarily certain of its own 

 existence; personal existence, in its "distinct" idea 

 (to use Cartesian language), being shown to imply the 

 contrasted and complemental existence of others, and, 

 further, the existence of God, as the ultimate stand- 

 ard involved in the entire round of self-definition by 

 self -correlation. 



In fact, my point is that the entire proof of our be- 

 ing free lies in showing that, mortals though we are, 

 and subject in one aspect of our existence to the 

 broken and tentative cognition called experience, we 

 still do originate judgments, and judgments that are 

 necessarily tnie, holding in perpetumn ; we do cognise 

 principles a priori, that is, spotitaneoiisly, and not be- 

 cause we are so "framed" by some other being, or 

 so impelled "from elsewhere," that we cannot do 

 otherwise. Thus the entire warranty for Personal 

 Idealism comes down, finally, to the affirmative settle- 

 ment of the bottom question in epistemology : Do we, 

 or do we not, set forth truths a priori? — and, at the 

 foundation, wJiat truths .-' If we do, and if at the 

 basis of all of them lies the act of self-definition by 

 self-correlation with others, then we are indeed free, 

 our being is rationally self-active, and the entire sys- 

 tem of Personal Idealism follows, in this high rational 

 sense of the expression. If we do not, or if we only 



