PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION xlvii 



and the objects in it, and (2) mere tilings, the passively 

 cojistitutcd parts in experience. Plainly, then, the 

 required proofs can only be brought by exhibiting 

 minds, through the study of them in our human selves 

 as types, in the actual exercise of spontaneous consti- 

 tutive judgment, — framing a world of things perceiv- 

 able, according to conceptions that derive in the last 

 resort from concepts a priori ; that is, from combina- 

 tive and constitutive acts of cognition, that are strictly 

 spontaneous with and in us, or with and in any beings 

 that are like us. 



Thus, once more, the whole proof comes down to 

 showing (i) that the doctrine of cognition a priori is 

 true and real, and (2) that the absolutely fundamental 

 cognition of this sort is the self-defining conscious- 

 ness of each mind that it exists just by being self- 

 aware, and, in that very fact, aware of its correlation 

 with a system of other minds. The steps in exhibit- 

 ing these two main members of the system of a priori 

 knowledge, the reader will come upon, more or less, 

 in every one of the essays; but if he require a more 

 specific direction, he may turn especially to pp. 19-21, 

 32 cf. 18, 46 seq., 300 seq., 306 seq., for the first; 

 and, for the second, to pp. 173-175, 310-312, 351- 

 354, and 359. However, these are, so to speak, only 

 samples. 



For the rest, to take a due notice of the critic who 

 has brought forward, out of an evidently wide philo- 



