Xii PREFACE 



ence, such a public and universal view must in every 

 mind be potential. I confess, however, that I am 

 almost ashamed to record, here and elsewhere in 

 these pages, this dissent from Professor James, — a 

 writer for whose genius I feel so warm an admira- 

 tion, and with whom, on the great main matter, 

 pluralism, I am in such hearty accord. Only, I 

 cannot consent to put our common metaphysics at 

 such risk and disadvantage, in comparison with 

 monism, as a confessed and despairing ultimate irra- 

 tionalism involves. 



Something of the same tenor I might say, too, 

 of my relation to the views of Mr. F. C. S. Schiller, 

 the versatile author of that striking book. Riddles 

 of the Sphinx. But in his case, it is chiefly his linite 

 and pathological "God" that I am unwilHng to admit 

 as an implication of pluralism, much as I delight 

 in the point and force of what he advances in sup- 

 port of our common view. 



To put the theory of the present book in a clearer 

 light, its chief points had best be summarised one 

 by one. They may be stated as follows : 



I. All existence is either (i) the existence of 

 minds, or (2) the existence of tJie items and order of 

 their experience ; all the existences known as "mate- 

 tial" consisting in certain of these experiences, with 



