THE LIMITS OF EVOLUTION I9 



Spring — of association, of unification, of synthesis, 

 in that consciousness itself. Nor can anybody 

 merely by the suggestion of a counter-theory, how- 

 ever plausible, dispose of those profound and pene- 

 trating arguments of Kant's by which the great 

 Konigsberger shows Time and Space, for instance, 

 to be a pHori, and exposes the fact that every 

 attempt to explain them as generalisations from 

 experience must tacitly assume them already opera- 

 tive in the very formation of the experiences from 

 which the generalisation is made. Without them, 

 Kant's point is, the thinker could not make use of 

 the experiences to generalise to them ; he must have 

 had them, and in forming experiences employed them 

 already, in order to his having in the experiences the 

 requisite characters on which to rest and support 

 the generalisation. 



The theory that the synthetic processes in our 

 human consciousness are merely associations of 

 habit, Hume, to be sure, construed as referring to 

 each single mind only ; and Kant's force in replying 

 to him might at first seem owing to this neglect of 

 the evolutional series in which experiences really 

 run. But adding the vast enginery of aeonic evolu- 

 tion to Hume's views really does nothing toward 

 removing that weighty and piercing objection of 

 Kant's. For even supposing all other cases con- 

 ceded, whatever seeming necessity of otJier ideas 



