THE LIMITS OF EVOLUTION 35 



urc, it is in the observations and experiments, or 

 in the sifting and correcting of them by the methods 

 of precision. The moment we are satisfied that 

 our particulars are exactly settled, that moment the 

 generalisation becomes irresistible, and we declare 

 that a law of Nature is disclosed. 



But now the crucial question is on us : What prompts 

 atid supports the generalisation? It cannot be just 

 the facts ; for, simply by themselves, they can mean 

 nothing but themselves. What is it, then ? The 

 implication is not to be escaped : the ground of 

 every generalisation is added in to the facts by the 

 generalising mind, on the prompting of a concep- 

 tion organic in it. This organic conception is, that 

 actual connexions between phenomena, supposing 

 them to be exactly ascertained, are not simply 

 actual, but are necessary. The logic of induction 

 thus rests at last on the mind's own declaration 

 that between phenomena there are connexions which 

 are real, not merely apparent, not simply phenome- 

 nal, but noumenal ; that the reality of such connex- 

 ions lies in their necessity, and that the processes 

 of Nature are accordingly unchangeable. But the 

 implication most significant of all in this tacit logic 

 is the indispensable postulate of the whole process ; 

 namely, that this necessity in the connexion of 

 phenomena issues from the organic action of the 

 mind itself. The mind itself, then, if the processes 



