LATER GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 1 13 



SO far reveals its real nature that we know it is some- 

 thing infallibly and infinitely intelligent. Strictly, it 

 is not the ^/^conscious, but rather the 5//(^conscious, 

 the Unbeknown {cias Unbewusste)} In its infallible 

 infinite-swiftness of perception, however, as expe- 

 rience testifies of it, there is a transcendent type of 

 the flashing inspirations of genius. It is therefore 

 not i-^^-conscious ; its intelligence is clairvoyant, and 

 has no "large discourse of reason, seeing the end in 

 the beginning." But as intelligent energy, it must 

 contain grounds for the two constituents that we find 

 present in all intelligent activity within experience — 

 will and representation ; and here is the point at which 

 to correct and complete Schopenhauer's doctrine of 

 the Absolute. Will is not the Absolute : for will as 

 well as representation is part of conscious experience ; 

 will is itself phenomenal. Rather are will and repre- 

 sentation the two coordinate primal manifestations of 

 the one Unconscious ; and we thus get an inductive 

 basis for Will and Idea as '>netap]iysical realities, both 

 nncotiscious, however, — factors inherent in the being 

 of the Unconscious. 



Here in the Unconscious, too, is the truth of Schel- 

 ling's famous Neiitrum — the something neither sub- 

 ject nor object, that he set up for the Absolute ; and 

 no longer, Hartmann thinks, a target for Hegel's "the 



^ Zekle crep' up quite unbeknown. 



Lowell: The Couriin\ 

 I 



