LATER GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 147 



logically impossible by it. Will, like cognition, 

 Lange holds to be merely phenomenon ; we cannot, 

 then, aver with Kant that we must be free, but only 

 that we must think ourselves free. 



But with this granted, Kant's way of grounding 

 ethics comes to an end, and we must seek, says 

 Lange, to frame a right world-view by consistently 

 carrying out our only initial certainty. We must 

 return to the problem of the source and limits of 

 cognition, where, fortunately, we can assume an a 

 priori organisation as having been established by 

 Kant. The elements, too, that Kant assigned to 

 this organisation — Space, Time, Cause, and the rest 

 — all belong there. But Kant's attempt to settle 

 a priori the exact number of such forms was nec- 

 essarily futile : there is no way to determine what 

 the contents of our a priori endowment are except 

 induction. Besides, the gradual progress of the 

 natural sciences, particularly the modern physiology 

 of the senses (in which the primary sensations — 

 light, colour, heat, sound, taste, odour, etc. — have all 

 been reduced to modes of motion), points clearly to 

 the probable omission of an essential form from 

 Kant's list : Motion should take its place among the 

 a priori forms of sense. 



Indeed, one principal aim of any attempt at a 

 reconstruction of the Ci'itiqnc of Pure Reason should 

 be to bring its doctrine into thorough accord with 



