LATER GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 1 65 



transcended conscious experience, and existed apart 

 from it as its object and ground. The a priori 

 category of substance and accident (subject and 

 predicate), which, properly, only connects one com- 

 posite phenomenon (called the " subject " of a 

 judgment) with another phenomenon (called the 

 ''predicate") so as to compose a new and fuller 

 unity, lends its term " substance " for this purpose ; 

 the category of cause and effect, which, properly, 

 connects one phenomenon with another so as to 

 condition and determine the second's occurrence, 

 lends similarly its term "cause"; and, in like man- 

 ner, the category of agent and reagent, which, prop- 

 erly, connects phenomena into a system of mutual 

 attraction and repulsion, lends its term "agent." 



Thus this triune hypostasis, by some a priori 

 impulse zvJiicJi Lange does not attempt to explain} 

 is projected beyond the limits of consciousness, 

 and is thought as one term of the relation Phe- 

 nomenon-Noumenon, while consciousness as a whole 

 is taken as the complemental term, its " organisa- 

 tion " (as Lange calls it) being viewed as the re- 

 agent, its sum of phenomena as the ejfect of an 

 interaction between it and the thing-in-itself, and 

 as the predicate of this supposititious being. By 

 this spontaneous contradiction of the strict nature 

 of its categorical system, our consciousness, con- 



^ Compare pp. 167 and 174, below, as referred to in their foot-notes. 



