176 £SSAyS IN PHILOSOPHY 



whole world of intelligences. This presupposition is 

 radically at variance with Kant's subsequent finis to 

 his theoretical critique, by which he shut in know- 

 ledge to the world of sense, and with La^ge's ac- 

 ceptance and development of this. It is simply in 

 keeping with this acceptance and development that 

 Lange takes the ground, which otherwise would be 

 quite surprising, that the contents of our a priori 

 endowment can only be determined by induction. 

 This position, however, is clearly a self-contradic- 

 tion. For an induction, despite its formal general- 

 ity, is always in its own value 2L particular judgment, 

 always comes short of full universality ; whereas, to 

 establish the apriority of an element, we must show 

 it to be strictly universal, or, in other words, neces- 

 sary. It is evident, then, that Lange has here finally 

 abandoned the standpoint proper to Kantianism, and, 

 without so intending, has really gone back to the 

 standpoint of Locke. There we may leave him and 

 his followers to the thoroughgoing surgery of Hume. 



A suflflcient cure, in fact, for all such agnostic 

 and empirical tendencies might be found in a faith- 

 ful study of Hume, not in the more literary and 

 much mitigated form in which he appears in the 

 Essays, but in his undiluted masterpiece, the Trea- 

 tise of Human Nature. The very common neglect 

 of the Treatise in behalf of the Essays is no doubt 



