HARMONY OF DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM 323 



possession of the law that rules it ; and he cannot 

 consciously possess the law, as a genuine lazv, man- 

 datory upon his world, except independently of 

 the world. The possession cannot be imparted to 

 him from without ; for then, at most, he could only 

 know it as mere fact true to date, without any 

 assured control over the future. That is, in the 

 phrase which Kant's decisive discussion has made 

 classic, to be free he must know the law a priori; 

 know it by its issuing from the spontaneous activity 

 of his own intelligence in defining himself, and by 

 its legislating thence upon his world of things. He 

 organises his world of sense-presented experience as 

 a compleraental part of his whole self-organised life. 

 Therefore, further, for a being who involves such a 

 finite world, the condition of his freedom in it, the 

 condition indispensable but at the same time suf- 

 ficient, is that his world shall indeed be his ; shall 

 be of him, not independent of him ; shall be em- 

 braced under his causal life, not added to it from 

 elsewhere as a constricting condition ; shall be, in 

 fine, a world of phenomena, — states of his own con- 

 scious being, organised by his spontaneous mental 

 life, — and not a world of " things-in-themselves." 



From this result, now, we can pass on to the re- 

 maining sense of determinism, its meaning of simple 

 definitencss without predestination, and can reach 

 our goal regarding the nature of freedom. We dis- 



