HARMONY OF DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM 333 



which the maker's transcendent skill should impart 

 the power to run perpetually, from the original 

 setting and winding of its mechanism. The plan, 

 to be sure, would be free relatively to the com- 

 ponent parts, and would control their movements ; 

 but the plan would not itself be free. It would 

 be derived from the contriving thought of the 

 maker, would be completely in subjection to that, 

 must simply unfold and follow out the course im- 

 planted in it. The maker alone would be the 

 source of its purposive action, the ijitention would 

 be his alone, and he alone would therefore merit 

 the fame or the shame of its performance. 



Either, then, we must carry out our modern moral 

 conception of God's nature and government into 

 a conception of creation that matches it — a concep- 

 tion based on that eternity (or intrinsic supertem- 

 poral self-activity) of man which alone can mean 

 moral freedom — or else, in all honesty and good 

 logic, we ought to travel penitently back to a Calvin- 

 ism, a Scotism, an Augustinianism, of the so-called 

 "highest" type. Then we would view man as a 

 "creature" indeed. We should have to accept him 

 as a being belonging to time only, with a definite date 

 of beginning, though lasting through unceasing ages, 

 if that could indeed then be. We should have to 

 surrender all freedom for him as a delusion. In 

 effect, with this conception of creation, we must 



