386 ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY 



path, once more upon the intrinsic autonomy of the rational 

 individual. 



Essay V then deals with this autonomy in its profound- 

 est form, as presented in the problem of religious belief. 

 The issue between Authority and Conviction is argued out 

 to its purest terms, and individual autonomy is established, 

 first indirectly, by refuting the theory of Authority, on the 

 ground (i) of its self-contradictions, (2) of its inability to 

 produce its Divine Authentication, (3) of its antagonism 

 to the essential drift in the historical development of 

 religion, as this shows at full flood in the Christian Con- 

 sciousness, measured by the teaching, not of Scripture or 

 of Church, but of Jesus himself. Direct proof then fol- 

 lows, by showing that the tacit logic of science, though not 

 indeed its results, — science, the field of the individual's 

 greatest triumphs as knower, — surely presupposes (i) the 

 reality of a society of minds in rational consensus, and 

 (2) the reality of a Perfect Mind, or God. Free inte/ligence 

 thus means conscience and dutiful self-control ; and vice 

 versa. 



In Essay VI, the unconditional reality of the individual 

 and the essentially social {i.e. moral) nature of his primor- 

 dial consciousness are proved by a still closer and fuller 

 vindication of Kant's arguments for the reaUty of our a 

 priori knowledge. This, as rendering each mind causa sui, 

 thus placing it in the world of absolute causes, is then ap- 

 plied to the proof of individual immortality. In the course 

 of the argument a solution is offered, on the basis of the 

 Kantian theory of Time, of the puzzle presented in the mod- 

 ern doctrine of " psychological parallelism." 



Finally, in Essay VII, the metaphysical significance of 

 moral autonomy is still more clearly exhibited, and is car- 

 ried out in its full bearing upon the nature of Divine causa- 

 tion. Determinism as extraneous predestination, Freedom 

 as inner caprice, are ahke set aside, and a new idealistic 



