APPENDIX D 413 



the unchangeable Ground presupposed by the changing 

 temporal ; the necessary as against the contingent ; the 

 independent as against the dependent ; the primary as 

 against the derivative ; the self-existent as against that 

 which exists in and through it ; the genuine cause, the 

 causa si/i, as against that which is after all nothing but 

 effect, however it may be tied, by the causa si/i, in an 

 unrupturable chain of antecedent and consequent. Or w^e 

 may say it means the noumenon as against the phenome- 

 non ; or, in fine, the thing in itse/f 71s against the thing in 

 other. That is, the relation between the eternal and the 

 temporal is not, and cannot be, only another case of the 

 temporal relation. The relation is just one of pure reason, 

 and is, in fact, sui generis : the eternal does not precede 

 the temporal by date, but only in logic ; it is the sitie qua 

 non without which the temporal cannot exist, nor is even 

 conceivable. In brief, throughout my book I mean by the 

 " eternal " simply the Real as contrasted with the appar- 

 ent ; the world of self-active causes as contrasted with the 

 world of derivative effects, in so far passive. 



I have surely taken every pains to make this plain, even 

 to the inexpert reader ; one would hardly have supposed 

 my accomplished critic could fail to take it in. Yet he has 

 failed : he expressly construes the " eternal reality of the 

 individual" as meaning an eve7'lasting p7-e existence of each 

 soul. He considers the organising relation which I show 

 the soul has toward Nature to be good ground, to be sure, 

 for a hope of its everlasting continuance beyond the grave, 

 but he says, " One finds it hard to take the jump from the 

 inference of an existence that may be endless to that of an 

 eternal pre'existcncc [italics mine] of such persons as dis- 

 tinct individuals ; or, . . . ' the coexistence of all souls in 

 eternity with God.' " Again, in expressing his acceptance 

 of " such a coexistence of some souls," on the ground that 

 " the conception of a lonely God may well be discarded for 



