APPENDIX D 415 



soul and soul, and between God and all other spirits ; and 

 he therefore declares it is too short to reach the object. 

 Doubtless in this last point he is right : to say that the true 

 and only causal relation between spirits is that of Final 

 Cause, is of course but another way of saying that all spirits 

 are causae sin, or eternal, and hence is, instead of the 

 proof, the proposition to be proved. But the proposal of 

 this view of Final Cause as the ladder is no proposal 

 of mine. I was quite amazed to read the reviewer's words. 

 It never occurred to me, in thinking out the system, nor in 

 writing the essays, that this very important step of putting 

 Final Causation at the root of the causal system was any 

 part of the positive argument for the belonging of the 

 individual to the eternal order. Doubtless it is an indis- 

 pensable precursor of the proof, in the way of showing just 

 what is to be proved ; for if the relation of God to souls is 

 that of their Efficient Cause, or literal Maker, they cannot 

 be possessed of a real freedom, cannot be the genuine 

 causes of their own acts and character; cannot belong, that 

 is, to the eternal order at all. But to be an indispensable 

 condition of a thing is far fro.n being the sufficient ground 

 for it. 



What, then, is the proof offered for this " stupendously 

 audacious " proposition? Have I really offered none? The 

 ieviewer declares, that, despite the sundry improvements 

 upon the monadology of Leibnitz which he is so kind as to 

 say I have made, I have still " not cleared the essential 

 objection to Leibnitz's scheme" — the objection that it is 

 " an indemonstrable ^ speculation, motived, indeed, by a 

 noble interest, but a cathedral in the clouds." Is this in 

 fact the case? 



It certainly is not. It would be strange indeed, if, com- 



^ Undemonstrated, I suppose is meant; to call the speculation 

 indemonstrable, is of course to beg the question. 



